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Assessing the Demographic 
Consequences of the Covid-19 
Pandemic
eMiLy KLancher Merchant
deMographers and other sociaL scientists have long recognized that so-
called natural disasters are always also social and political. While extreme 
weather events, earthquakes, famines, and pandemics may originate in na-
ture, their effects are always structured by existing social inequities and by 
political responses. In the Anthropocene—our current geological epoch, in 
which biogeochemical change is primarily driven by human activities—it has 
become clear that even the origins of such disasters are not entirely natural. 
Natural disasters are typically localized in space, usually within countries, 
foreclosing the possibility of comparative analysis. As a global pandemic, 
however, the Covid-19 event affords demographers an unusual research op-
portunity. As demographers investigate the demographic consequences of the 
pandemic in the regions with which they are most familiar, they should also 
collaborate on comparative analysis to determine how social inequities and 
political responses in various parts of the world mediated between a global 
disease and its local demographic effects. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has by now had an unmistakable impact on 
each of the core demographic processes—mortality, fertility, and migration—
in all parts of the world. It has also affected the collection of demographic data. 
This essay describes some of the demographic consequences in the United 
States in order to point to opportunities for comparison with other parts of 
the world. To investigate these consequences, demographers will need data 
and methods with which to measure the short- and long-term effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic on fertility, mortality, and migration, taking into account 
global disease processes, local social structures, and political responses at the 
level of public health institutions. (In many countries, this is the national 
level, but, in the United States, it has typically been the state or county level.) 
Such comparative research will not only help us better understand why Co-
vid-19 had the demographic consequences it had (and will continue to have) 
in each part of the world, but may also point to ways we can make societies 
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around the world more resilient in the face of future disasters that may not 
be individually predictable, but are sure to come in one form or another, 
particularly as the pace of climate change increases. 
Mortality 
Perhaps the most obvious demographic consequence of the Covid-19 pan-
demic has been an increase in mortality, both from the disease caused by 
the SARS-COV2 virus and from the secondary effects of the virus on health 
systems and economies. According to the Johns Hopkins University Corona-
virus Resource Center, more than 1.8 million people worldwide have died 
from Covid-19 at the time of this writing, with over 350,000 deaths—ap-
proximately 19 percent of the total—occurring in the United States. While 
the early rhetoric surrounding Covid-19 maintained that the disease does not 
discriminate, it quickly became clear that not everyone is equally susceptible. 
People who are unable to isolate are at greater risk of contracting the disease, 
while those who are older or carry a heavier burden of preexisting condi-
tions and comorbidities are less likely to survive it. In the United States, these 
categories intersect with one another and with the categories that structure 
social inequality, in this case race and socioeconomic status. Poor and non-
white Americans are less likely to be able to isolate—due to service-sector 
and factory jobs, jobs that do not offer paid (or sometimes even unpaid) sick 
time, and household crowding—and are more likely to carry comorbidities 
as a result of living in food deserts, the inequitable siting of environmental 
hazards, and stark inequalities in access to health care. In other countries, 
different histories of social inequality will likely structure mortality in differ-
ent ways. Also critical is the public health response to the pandemic, which 
was abrupt and highly effective in many parts of Asia (including Australia 
and New Zealand), somewhat less so in Europe, and truly deplorable in the 
United States and some parts of Latin America. Comparative research on the 
short- and long-term mortality consequences of Covid-19 will need to tease 
the effects of the disease itself apart from the underlying social conditions that 
made some people more susceptible to it and from the political and public 
health response.
Fertility
In contrast to the mortality consequences of Covid-19, which became appar-
ent very early on and have been diligently tracked by a number of agencies, 
it may take several years to fully understand and account for the fertility 
consequences. These studies, too, will need to examine the results of the 
disease itself, such as the potential effects of Covid-19 on sperm production; 
underlying social inequities, such as existing risks of maternal and perinatal 
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mortality, which may have been exacerbated by the pandemic; and policy 
responses that may shape future childbearing decisions through the distribu-
tion of the burden of childcare. In the United States, the immediate effects 
of Covid-19 on fertility operated through those who were pregnant when 
the pandemic began and those who were in the process of trying to conceive 
with the help of various assisted reproductive technologies (ART). Among 
those who were pregnant when the pandemic began, the same women who 
already face higher risks of maternal and perinatal mortality—poor women 
and especially black women and Latinas—also faced a higher risk of contract-
ing Covid-19. Those who were trying to conceive using ART had to pause 
this process while health systems retooled to focus on treating Covid-19. As 
the pandemic wore on, however, fertility clinics reopened, and many people 
renewed their efforts to conceive. 
In the long run, policy responses to the pandemic will also affect fertil-
ity through the future childbearing decisions of individuals and couples. In 
the United States, the pandemic demonstrated that, even at the best of times, 
most families get by only through a delicate balancing act, piecing together 
the inadequate and largely unregulated childcare resources that are available 
to those who can afford them. When the pandemic shut down schools and 
day care centers in March, it was largely mothers who put their careers on 
hold to take care of young children and to help older children navigate their 
classes on Zoom. This is not a natural response to the pandemic, but rather 
one overdetermined by a long history of gender discrimination in the labor 
force and an absence of policies to support working mothers and dual-career 
families. Indeed, the same factors that have kept fertility lower in countries 
like Italy and Japan, where mothers are primarily responsible for childcare, 
than in countries like Sweden, where there is more public support for dual-
career families, will also determine the long-term fertility consequences of 
Covid-19.
Migration 
The migration consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic will also need to be 
evaluated in both the short- and long-term. When it became clear that the 
SARS-COV2 virus was going to cause a pandemic, countries around the world 
began to limit travel and close borders. As a result, many international so-
journers returned to their countries of origin, while others decided to remain 
abroad for the duration. An unexpected consequence was that, as workers 
abroad were prevented from returning home due to travel restrictions, the 
migrant smuggling business developed a sideline of smuggling people back 
home. As universities scrambled to shift classes online, many also closed their 
dormitories, sending students home to various parts of the world. These re-
locations are likely to be relatively short-lived. Most universities and college 
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students are anxiously awaiting a return to campus life, and restrictions on 
travel will undoubtedly ease when a vaccine or effective treatments become 
available. The increase in remote work, however, may have a longer-term 
impact on migration. Now that it has become apparent that many jobs can be 
done remotely, some large employers have begun to reevaluate their work-
from-home or telecommuting policies, and smaller employers are likely to 
follow suit. An increase in opportunities to work remotely will also afford 
some people—those with jobs that can be done remotely—a broader set of 
choices over where to live that could dramatically reshape social geographies. 
An impressive number of countries, ranging from Antigua to Georgia, are 
offering one-year renewable remote work visas to “digital nomads” who can 
demonstrate income and health insurance and afford to pay a fairly modest 
fee. Demographers will need to investigate the determinants of migration 
when some people are no longer geographically bound by their jobs, and 
should examine how the extreme mobility of some workers—typically those 
with jobs that pay more and offer better benefits—affects the fortunes of im-
mobile workers, such as those in service industries that rely on proximity to 
their clientele. As with mortality and fertility, the migration consequences of 
the Covid-19 pandemic and the shift to remote work will be shaped primarily 
by underlying social structures and public policies.
Demographic Data 
In addition to its effects on mortality, fertility, and migration rates and pat-
terns, the Covid-19 pandemic has also had consequences for the collection of 
demographic data. This has been most apparent in the United States, where 
the in-person enumeration of households that did not return their 2020 
Census form by mail or respond online was first delayed by the pandemic 
and then curtailed prematurely by the Trump administration, likely leading 
to an unnecessarily high rate of undercounting. Under ordinary circum-
stances, it is relatively straightforward for demographers to determine who 
was missed by a census. However, the enormous demographic upheavals 
generated by the Covid-19 pandemic will likely make this task more dif-
ficult. One particular challenge stems from the fact that many of the people 
who are most vulnerable to undercounting—the poor and non-White, as 
well as non-English-speakers—are also particularly vulnerable to Covid-19 
mortality. Another stems from the fact that most U.S. universities closed in 
March, scattering students across the country and the world right before the 
Census. The American media has paid particular attention to the 2020 U.S. 
Census because of the controversies that had already surrounded it—most 
notably the citizenship question—and because of the political consequences 
of undercounting. However, the United States is not alone in the impact the 
Covid-19 pandemic has had on its census. Since 1950, the United Nations has 
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encouraged all countries of the world to take censuses in or near years ending 
in zero, so many countries have had to manage enumeration in the midst 
of the pandemic. While a few countries—such as Mexico and Mongolia—
completed their data collection early in the year, most have had to suspend 
or delay enumeration, or substitute data from population registers or other 
administrative records. The pandemic will, therefore, have a larger effect on 
demographic data collection in countries that lack adequate administrative 
records and communication infrastructures that would facilitate enumeration 
by mail, telephone, or Internet rather than in person.
As a global pandemic unfolding simultaneously across the world, the 
Covid-19 episode affords unique opportunities for comparative research on all 
of the basic demographic processes. Such research may be able to determine 
the specific contributions of the disease itself, underlying social inequities, 
and policy responses to changes in mortality, fertility, migration, and census-
taking. Understanding these natural, social, and political factors will be critical 
to evaluating vulnerability to future natural (and not-so-natural) disasters, 
and to promoting resilience. 
